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STA TEMENT OF THE CASE

A. NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the conviction by the jury of the charge of Grand Theft by
Possession in violation ofldaho Codes§§ 18-2403(4) and 18-2407(1 ).

B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
On or about March 23, 20 I 0, Abraham Vargas was arrested in Cassia County, State of
Idaho and charged with Grand Theft by Possession. (R. pp. 2, 16-19.) A Criminal Complaint was
filed on the same day, charging Abraham Vargas with felony Grand Theft , Idaho Code Sections
§§18-2403(4) and 18-2407. (R. pp. 2, 14-15.) Mr. Vargas was arraigned on March 24, 2010 and
a bond was set for $25,000 cash or surety. (R. p. I 0.) A preliminary hearing was held on April
9, 20 IO and Judge Rick Bollar granted the State a request for a continuance after presentation of
evidence. (R. pp. 42-43.) An additional preliminary hearing was held on April 23, 2010 (R. pp.
48-49.) An information and an Order holding Defendant to answer in District Court was filed on
or about April 26 and April 27, 2010. (R. pp. 51-54.) On or about May 18, 2010, Abraham
Vargas entered a plea of not guilty before the District Court.
On or about June 25, 2010, the Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress. (R. pp. 81-87.) A
hearing was held on the motion on July 21, 2010 and the motion was denied. (R. pp. 97-99.)
On June 3, 2010, the Defendant filed his Motion for Jury Instructions in which he
requested to define value as follows:
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"The market value of the property at the time and place of the crime, or if the market
value cannot be satisfactorily ascertained, value can be shown by any number of
measures including salvage value, replacement value, replacement cost, purchase price,
and the property's general use and purpose." (R. pp. 72-77.)
On July 21, 2010 a hearing was held regarding the Defendant's proposed jury
instructions. The District Judge did not make a determination regarding the Defendant's
proposed jury instructions at this time. (R. pp. 97-99.)
On July 26, 2010, the State submitted their proposed jury instructions and defined value
as follows:
"The market value of the property at the time and place of the crime, or if the market
value cannot be satisfactorily ascertained, the cost ofreplacement of the property within a
reasonable time after the crime." (R. p. 112.)
On July 29, 20 I 0, a jury trial was held in which the jury found the Defendant guilty of
Grand Theft by Possession under Idaho Codes §§ I 8-2403( 4) and 18-2407(1 ). At the jury trial,
the District Judge adopted the pattern jury instruction submitted by the State and defined value as
"the market value of the property at the time and place of the crime, or, if the market value
cannot be satisfactorily ascertained, the cost ofreplacement of the property within a reasonable
time after the crime." (R. p. 144.) A separate jury instruction advised that Grand Theft is theft
of property that exceeds $1,000. Any theft which is not grand theft is a Petit Theft. (R. p. 145.)
The Defendant was sentenced on October 12, 20 IO (R. p. 155) and the Judgment of
Conviction was entered on the same day. The Defendant was sentenced to probation. (R. pp.
168-170.)
On November 12, 2010, the Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal. (R. pp. 176-178.)
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C. STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Appellant (hereinafter Abraham Vargas) was arrested on or about March 23, 2010
and accused of the crime of Grand Theft by Possession for possessing metal pipe from a field in
Cassia County, Idaho. Abraham Vargas was charged pursuant to Idaho Codes §§18-2403(4) and
18-2407(1 ), which states that a person is guilty of Grand Theft by Possession when he knowingly
receives, retains, conceals, obtains control over, possesses, or disposes of stolen property,
knowing the property to have been stolen or under such circumstances as would reasonably
induce him to believe that the property was stolen and when the property taken exceeds $1,000
in value.
On or sometime shortly before March 20,2011, several pieces of pipe owned by Oakley
Idaho Corps, had been removed for repair by a repair crew. The pipe was very old and rusty. A
short time later, the pipe went missing. It is unknown who took the pipe. On March 20, 2011,
this same pipe was delivered to a recycling yard named Santos Metals and Recycling in Burley,
Idaho. The owner of the recycling yard, Manuel Santos assisted Abraham Vargas and another
man unload the pipe. This pipe was later discovered when the foreman of Oakley Idaho Corps,
Kaye Young, went to recycling yards to see if the pipe would show up. When he went to Santos
Metals and Recycling, he identified the pipe. When the pipe was recovered by Kaye Young, it
was placed back into the ground to be used as well casing for a water pump. (Jury Transcript
pp. 65-68.)
The pipe had presumably been delivered on two separate days, March 20, 2011 and
March 22, 2011. It is evident from the Recycling Logs, admitted into evidence as Defendant's
Exhibit A, that Abraham Vargas delivered the pipes and other pieces of scrap metal to Santos
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Recycling on March 20, 2010. In this exhibit, Abraham Vargas' signature is listed under the
signature line. The salvage value of the metal he delivered was $95.85 for aluminum and
$178.00 for scrap. On a separate line, it shows that Abraham Vargas was compensated $141.42
for scrap for a combined total of $415.27 compensation on March 20, 2010. It is not identified
in the logs what portion of scrap are the pipes and what portion are other pieces of scrap metal.
All of the aluminum submitted is most likely not pipe because the State did not present evidence
that the pipes were made of aluminum. Manuel Santos, owner of Santos Metals and Recycling,
claims that the total salvage value for all the pipes delivered on both days was $332.52. (Jury
Transcript p. 101.)
It seems clear from testimony by Manuel Santos that two people were involved in the
delivery of the pipe. (See jury trial transcript pp. 93-95.) It is less clear from Manuel Santos'
testimony if Abraham Vargas submitted the pipe on both days, or on both March 20, 2010 and
March 22, 2010. Rather, it seems that Abraham Vargas delivered the pipe on March 20, 2010
but that another man delivered the pipe on March 22, 2010. Although Manuel Santos states that
Abraham Vargas delivered the pipe on two separate occasions and perhaps on two separate days
(See jury trial transcript p. 87), he also states that on the first day, or March 20, 2010, Mr.
Vargas was with someone else. (Jury Transcript p. 86.) On the second day, or March 22, 2010,
only one man went to Santos Metal and Recycling. (Jury Transcript p. 86.) This man is
identified by Manuel Santos as Abraham Vargas. (Jury Transcript p. 86 and p. 96.) However,
Abraham Vargas is not listed on the signature line of the Recycling Logs on March 22, 2010.
Only Miguel Magana is listed on the signature line. (See Defendant's Exhibit A.)
At trial, the State presented evidence of the market value of the pipes or well casing. The
State did not pursue a line of questioning concerning whether there was a market for used pipe of
4

comparable characteristics and quality to the pipe unlawfully possessed. Mr. Eric Staley owns a
pump company, named GJ Verti-Line Pumps in Twin Falls, Idaho and has worked at this
business for about 22 years. (See jury transcript pp. 40-41 ). Mr. Staley testified that about 19
pieces of 10 foot length pipe were missing. (Jury Transcript p. 48.) The price for a new piece of
10 foot pipe is approximately $530.00. (Jury Transcript p. 51.) He would prefer to sell used
pipe, if he had it, at about 60% of what it costs to buy new pipe. (Jury Transcript p. 51.)
The pipe in question is extremely old and rusted. (Jury Transcript p. 49 and p. 68.) The
pipe is also possibly radioactive (Jury Transcript p. 97.)
Mr. Staley stated that he had on one occasion "probably" bought some used pipe within a
year of the trial date. Mr. Staley provides no details of what kind of used pipe he bought. There
is no indication that Mr. Staley has ever sold used pipe. (Jury Transcript at p. 57.) He provides
no details of ever buying or selling used pipe which is similar to the pipe which is the subject of
this appeal. Mr. Staley, on cross-examination admits that there is not a current market for used
pipe because used pipe is not available. He states, "There would be a market for it if it was
available. I mean, I have customers all the time ask me ifthere 's any used stuff, ifl have any
used stuff available." (Jury Transcript p. 60.) To reiterate, defense counsel stated, "So I'm going
to ask again. How frequently do you sell this used pipe? Because I want to get an assessment
about what the market is." In response, Mr. Staley states, "Well, I had a customer yesterday ask
for 'used stuff, but I don't have it to sell is the problem. Ifl have the stuff, I could sell it more
often. It's just not available." (Jury Transcript p. 61.) Mr. Staley does not identify what "used
stuff' is. He admitted that market value for anything he sells used is a somewhat arbitrary. (Jury
Transcript p. 58.) Mr. Staley provides no historical proof of a market for old and rusty and
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perhaps even radioactive pipe. He stated only what he would like to buy and sell the used pipe
for if he had it, or if it was available.
At the close of evidence, counsel for Defendant again requested a jury instruction which
would allow the jury to consider salvage value. This request was denied. (Jury Transcript p.
167.)

6

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1. Did the State provide sufficient evidence that the Defendant, Abraham Vargas,
knowingly received, retained, concealed, obtained control over, possessed, or disposed of
stolen property worth more than $1,000.00 pursuant to Idaho Statutes§§ 18-2403(4) and
18-2407(1 )?

2. Did the State provide sutiicient evidence of market value for the used pipes pursuant
to Idaho Statute§ 18-2407(1) and State of Idaho v. Johnson, 149 Idaho 259 (Ct. App.
2010)?

3. Did the State provide sufficient evidence of the replacement value of the old, rusty and
possibly radioactive pipe pursuant to Idaho Statute §18-2407(1) and State v. Hughes, 130
Idaho 698 (Idaho App. 1997)?

4. Did the District Court err in denying Abraham Vargas's Motion to submit jury
instructions regarding salvage value?
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ARGUMENT
There is no question that several pieces of pipe went missing from a remote field in
Cassia County, Idaho and that this pipe eventually ended up at Santos Metals and Recycling shop
in Burley, Idaho. There is no question that this pipe was later placed back into the ground to be
used for a water pump. There is no question that the pipe is extremely old and rusty and that the
salvage value for the pipe is $332.50.
There are questions as to what Mr. Abraham Vargas actually possessed. There are
serious questions as to the actual value of the pipe. The market value of the used pipe was never
ascertained at trial and the State did not attempt to ascertain the market value for pipe of similar
quality and characteristics as the pipe actually removed in this case. The cost ofreplacement,
using pipe similar to that which was actually taken, was also never established at trial. It is
unfair to charge the Defendant with felony Grand Theft by Possession, when he only possessed
seemingly worthless old and rusty pipe worth $332.52. The jury should have been able to
consider salvage value as a possible estimate of value.
I. Did the state present sufficient evidence that Abraham Vargas possessed all of the
pipe?
Ajury verdict will not be disturbed on appeal where there is substantial evidence upon
which a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of
proving essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307,313, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2785-86; State v. Filson, 101 Idaho 381, 386, 613 P.2d 938,943
(1980); State v. Nasta.ff, 124 Idaho 667,671,862 P.2d 1089, 1093 (Ct. App. 1993).
The state has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant
knowingly received, retained, concealed, obtained control over, possessed, or disposed of stolen
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property, knowing the property to have been stolen or under such circumstances as would
reasonably induce him to believe that the property was stolen, under Idaho Code §18-2403(4).
The State further has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to show that the value of the
property is in excess of$1,000.00 Idaho Code §18-2407(1). State v. Hughes, 130 Idaho 698,
702,946 P.2d 1338, 1343 (Ct. App. 1997).
In this case, it appears clear that Abraham Vargas delivered pipe and was compensated
for it, on March 20, 2010. This is clear because Abraham Vargas' signature is on the Recycling
Logs provided by Santos Metals and Recycling. It is much less clear what pipe Abraham Vargas
actually delivered on March 20, 2010 because it is not described in the logs and Mr. Vargas also
delivered other pieces of scrap metal and aluminum.
Two days later, on March 22, 2010, another man delivered the pipe. Although it appears
clear from the testimony of Manuel Santos, the lone witness of the delivery in this case, that
Abraham Vargas delivered the pipe on March 20, 2010 and March 22, 2010. However, it also
appears clear from the testimony of Manuel Santos that only one person went to Santos Metals
and Recycling on March 22, 2010 and that person could not have been Abraham Vargas because
he is not listed or has not signed his name on the Recycling Logs. The person who signed his
name to delivery of the pipe is Miguel Migana. Thus, we do not know, and the State has not
presented sufficient evidence to prove that the Defendant was in possession of all of the pipe.
Further, it has not been established by the State how much pipe was delivered by Abraham
Vargas on March 20, 2010. It is therefore impossible to conclude that Abraham Vargas was in
possession of all of the pipe or that he was in possession of some pipe that exceeded a value of
$1000.00.
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The State has presented hearsay evidence from Abraham Vargas that both he and Mr.
Migana went to Santos Recycling on both days. This is not the testimony of the lone eye-witness
and is not supported by the Recycling Log.
IL Did the State present sufficient evidence of market value of the pipes?
Idaho Code §18-2407(1) states that a person is guilty of grand theft when he commits a
theft and when the value of the property taken exceeds one thousand dollars ($1,000).
Value is defined in several different ways. In State v. Johnson, the Idaho Appeals Courts
states:
Under Idaho law, a theft constitutes a felony if the value of the property taken
exceeds $1,000, LC. §18-2407( 1)(b )( 1). If the stolen items are of lesser value, the
offense is petit theft, a misdemeanor. LC. §18-2407(2). For purposes of the theft
statute, "value" means "the market value of the property at the time and place of
the crime, or if such cannot be satisfactorily ascertained, the cost of replacement
of the property within a reasonable time after the crime." LC. §18-2402(1 l)(a).
Thus, under the statutory scheme, in a prosecution for grand theft the State must
prove either that the market value of the stolen property exceeded $1,000 or it
must prove a market value cannot be satisfactorily ascertained and may thereupon
rely on the replacement cost as the value. If no value can be satisfactorily
ascertained under the standards of LC. §18-2402(1 l)(a), then the property's value
is deemed to be $1,000 or less. LC. §18-2402(11)(c). State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho
259,233 P.3d 190, 194 (Ct. App. 2010).
As stated before, a jury's finding that a disputed element of a crime has been proven will
not be set aside on appeal if there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable jury could
have found that the State sustained its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. State v.

Johnson, 149 Idaho 259,233 P.3d 190, 194 (Ct. App. 2010) (quoting State v. Estes, 148 Idaho
345,347,223 P.3d 287,289 (Ct. App. 2009).
In State v. Johnson, the Defendant was accused of stealing copper wire and then later
selling this wire to Pacific Steel and Recycling (PSR). Two types of valuation evidence were
10

admitted at Johnson's trial. First, it was shown that the salvage value of the stolen wire was
approximately $665, which was the price paid by PSR to Johnson for the wire as scrap. Second,
an employee of Union Pacific Railroad (UPR) testified that the company had to pay
approximately $2,000 for the replacement signal wire. The State presented no evidence of
market value of the used copper wire, but instead argued that on appeal that it showed that a
market value could not be satisfactorily ascertained and that the State, therefore, was entitled to
use replacement cost as the proper measure of value pursuant to I.C. §18-2402(1 l)(a). State v.
Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 233 P .3d 190, 194 (Ct. App. 2010).

The Idaho Appeals Court held that "as the State did not pursue a line of questioning
concerning whether there was a market for used wire of comparable characteristics and quality to
that stolen, there is no evidence that a market value was not satisfactorily ascertainable.
Therefore, resort to replacement value was not authorized under I.C. §18-2402. Based on a lack
of evidence, the Appeals Court reduced the judgment of conviction to a misdemeanor. State v.
Johnson, 149 Idaho 259,233 P.3d 190, 194-195 (Ct. App. 2010).

In this case, two types of evidence were presented at trial. First, it has been shown that
the salvage value of the pipes was $332.52, which was the price paid by Santos Metals and
Recycling for the pipes as scrap. Second, the owner ofGJ Verti-Line Pumps, Eric Staley,
testified that the market value for a new piece often foot pipe is $530 for each piece. Mr. Staley
further testified that if he had used pipe, he would try and sell it for 60% of what the new pipe
costs. Thus, it appears on its face, that Mr. Staley has provided market value evidence of the
used pipe. However, the State presented no evidence of the actual market value for used pipe "of
the same characteristics and quality" as the pipe which is the subject of this case. Mr. Staley
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merely speculated on what he hoped the market might be if in fact there was a market, which
there is not. He ignores any comparison of his pipe to the pipe stolen in this case.
First, it does not appear, nor did the State ask, if Mr. Staley had ever bought and sold
used pipe of the type, character and quality of pipe which is the subject of this case. Mr. Staley
does say that he probably bought some used pipe perhaps within a year or so. He never testifies
that he ever sold it and never states what kind of pipe he bought. (Jury Transcript pp.56-57.)
Second, Mr. Staley never states that he has old, or used pipe even sitting in his yard. (Jury
Transcript p. 56.) Third, Mr. Staley clearly states that there is not a market for old rusty pipe
because there is not any pipe available. (Jury Transcript pp. 60-61.) If old pipe is available,
there is no indication that people will want the exact type of pipe which is the subject of this
case. Mr. Staley does mention that some people might want, "used stuff." (Jury Transcript p.
61.) He doesn't say what that "used stuff' is. A market contemplates some sort of buying or
selling. None of that is evident here. Finally, a price tag of 60% of whatever the new price is,
amounts to a fairy tale. It is merely a preference about what is wanted, without any basis as to
what is actually being bought or sold, or the quality of what is being bought and sold, or any
reference to price history or actual supply and demand levels.

State v. Johnson requires the State prove, or attempt to ascertain, the market for used pipe
which is comparable in characteristics and quality to that actually stolen. (Emphasis Added).
This has simply not been done. It is unknown what this specific type of pipe, which is old, rusty
and possibly radioactive, might sell for or what it has sold for in the past.
As the State has presented no evidence of the actual market value of the particular old
and rusty pipe in this case, it has failed to prove that the pipe is worth over $1,000. Further, as
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the State has not pursued a line of questioning concerning whether there was a market or not for
used pipe of comparable characteristics and quality to that stolen, there is no evidence that a
market value was not satisfactorily ascertainable and the State should not be permitted to pursue
replacement value as an alternative to market value.
Therefore, consistent with the decision in State v. Johnson, resort to replacement value
should not be authorized under LC. §18-2402(1 l)(a) and the charge should be reduced to a
misdemeanor for lack of evidence of value over $1,000.
III. Did the State present sufficient evidence of the comparable replacement value of the
old and rusty pipe?
Even if it is assumed that a market for old pipe of comparable characteristics is not
ascertainable and the State proved this and may therefore resort to replacement value, the State
has nonetheless not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the replacement pipes are of the same
quality and design as those of the pipes taken in this case.
In State v. Hughes, the Idaho Appeals Court held:
"If the State attempts to prove value through replacement cost, however, we think
it incumbent upon the State to produce some evidence that the replacement item is
of a quality and design comparable to that of the destroyed item. This is so
because a replacement actually purchased by the crime victim may bear little or
no relationship to the quality and value of the destroyed property, and the
classification of the offense as a misdemeanor or a felony should not turn upon
the victim's choice between a higher quality, more expensive replacement and a
lower quality, more modestly priced item." 130 Idaho 698,699, 946 P.2d 1338,
1344. (Ct. App. 1997).

In Hughes, the Defendant had completely destroyed a repair shop door and was therefore
charged for felony malicious injury to property under Idaho Code § 18-7001. At trial, the shop
owner testified that it cost him $2,332.00 to replace the door. This cost included replacement of
not only the door, but the guides, rollers, and electric opener. Id. at 704 and 1344.
13

On cross-examination, the shop owner was unable to give any estimate of the value of the
door prior to its destruction. The State made no effort to prove the market value of the door, but
instead relied on the price of the new door. There was no evidence that compared the design,
composition or quality of the old door with that of the replacement. Id. The Idaho Appeals
Court concluded that, "the jury's determination that Hughes was guilty of a felony offense cannot
stand," and therefore reduced the charge to a misdemeanor. Id.
In this case, the State has not provided any comparison information regarding the used
pipes and the possible used replacement pipes. It is problematic at the outset that little is known
about the pipes in this case. The State did not provide any substantive details as to what each
piece of removed pipe is like, apart from photographs. For instance, it is unknown exactly how
old the pipes in this case are, how much they cost originally, how corroded they are, if they have
sustained any significant water damage, cuts, holes or scars, or if they might be radioactive. It is
unknown when the pipes might need to be replaced, removed or dug back up again for repair.
Apart from a very limited understanding of the quality and character of the pipes in this
case, much less is known of the possible used replacement pipes because there aren't any. It
cannot therefore be stated that used replacement pipes might be comparable to the pipes which
were removed in this case.
As the State has not met its burden of comparison between the replacement pipes and the
removed pipes in this case beyond a reasonable doubt, (and has not pursued a line of questioning
to determine comparison) it cannot sustain a theory of value based on replacement costs. The
Grand Theft felony charged should be reduced to a misdemeanor.
IV. Did the District Court err in denying Abraham Vargas' Motion to include salvage
value as a consideration when determining value?
14

The Defendant requested that the jury be allowed to consider salvage value when making
a choice about how much the old pipes are worth. This request was denied.
The standard of review when reviewing jury instructions on appeal requires this Court to
determine whether the jury was properly and adequately instructed. Therefore, the Court must
review the instructions and ascertain whether the instructions, when considered as a whole, fairly
and adequately present the issues of the case and state the applicable law. Brooks v. Gigray

Ranches, Inc., 128 Idaho 72, 76, 910 P.2d 744, 748 (1996).
"If market value cannot be established, value can be shown by any number of measures
other than just salvage value including purchase price, replacement cost, and the property's
general use and purpose. The choice of which measure is appropriate depends on the
circumstances of the individual case. Salvage value generally will not be the appropriate
measure if it was the defendant's actions that caused the item to be useless for anything other
than scrap." State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 233 P.3d 190, 194 (Ct. App. 2010).
This holding clearly allows for an instruction regarding salvage value, especially when
the Defendant did not cause the pipe to be useless. Salvage value could have been considered
along with other elements such as market value and replacement value in determining if the
pipe's value exceeded $1,000. By failing to allow an instruction on salvage value, the District
Court left the door wide open for the prosecution to dismiss consideration of salvage value
altogether by allowing the prosecutor at closing to simply state that salvage value is not part of
the jury instructions.
As it stands, failure to instruct the jury regarding salvage value in the context of State v.

Johnson, is not extremely prejudicial because, like State v. Johnson, the State has not proven the
15

market value of the old pipe or the replacement value of comparable pipe under State v. Hughes.
So although the Defendant disputes the District Court's refusal to allow the jury to consider
salvage value in estimating value and considers it error and should be designated as such on
appeal, the Defendant does not believe this issue to be extremely important given the complete
lack of evidence related to market value and replacement value of the old and used pipe.
CONCLUSION
As the State has not proven market value or comparable replacement value beyond a
reasonable doubt, the felony charge of Grand Theft by Possession under Idaho Codes §§ 182403(4) and 18-2407(1), should be reduced to a misdemeanor in accordance with the holdings in

State v. Johnson and State v. Hughes.
DATED THIS

£

th

day of June, 2011.
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